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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 Raritan Baykeeper and the Edison Wetlands 
Association (collectively, “Raritan Baykeeper”) brought this 
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suit under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(“RCRA”) and the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) to bring about 
the remediation of contaminated sediments in the Raritan 
River.  The District Court, citing the involvement and 
expertise of the New Jersey Department of Environmental 
Protection, dismissed the action on abstention grounds.  We 
conclude that this case does not call for abstention, and we 
will vacate the judgment of the District Court. 
I. 
 The following facts derive from the complaint, whose 
allegations we presume true for the purposes of this appeal.  
From the 1930s until 1982, NL Industries (“NL”) 
manufactured titanium dioxide pigments on a 440-acre plot of 
land (“the site”) surrounded on three sides by the Raritan 
River.  Although NL ceased its operations on the site in 1982, 
it retained ownership of the property and leased portions of it 
to other companies, who manufactured sulfuric acid on the 
site.  NL continued to own the site until 2005, when the 
Sayreville Economic and Redevelopment Agency (“SERA”) 
acquired the site by eminent domain.  SERA chose O’Neill 
Properties Group, L.P. (“O’Neill”) as the site’s developer and 
O’Neill, in turn, formed Sayreville Seaport Associates, L.P. 
(“SSA”) to purchase and redevelop the site.  SERA, O’Neill, 
SSA, and the County of Middlesex entered into an agreement 
controlling the sale of the site.  Although the agreement made 
SSA responsible for most environmental issues at the site, it 
provided that NL would retain liability for contamination of 
sediments in the Raritan River.  The agreement does not, 
however, call for any remediation of the sediments. 
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 Prior to 2005, when NL still owned the site, the 
company began to address the site’s environmental issues.  In 
1988, NL undertook an environmental investigation of the 
site pursuant to New Jersey’s Environmental Cleanup 
Responsibility Act, which has since been renamed the 
Industrial Site Recovery Act.  NL also entered into an 
administrative consent order with the New Jersey Department 
of Environmental Protection (“NJDEP”), requiring NL to 
investigate contamination at the site and to perform 
remediation of certain areas.  Pursuant to the order, NL 
collected sediment samples from the Raritan River in 2000 
and 2002 and analyzed them for contaminants.  Sediments 
from the portions of the river both adjacent to and 
downstream from the site showed elevated levels of arsenic, 
copper, lead, and zinc.  NL concluded, however, that sources 
other than the site, such as nearby roadways, were 
contributing to the pollution of river sediments.  
 NL submitted its analysis of river sediments to 
NJDEP.  In 2004, NJDEP issued a letter in which the agency 
agreed that off-site sources were contributing to the 
contamination of river sediments and that “any remedial 
actions conducted in this area of the river should be part of a 
regional approach.”  (A. 117.)  NJDEP did not require NL to 
undertake any further investigation or remediation.  To date, 
no such “regional approach” has been proposed, let alone 
commenced.  In 2009, however, the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) ordered 
remediation of river sediments upstream from the site.   
 Shortly after the EPA action, Raritan Baykeeper 
brought this suit against NL, SERA, SSA, O’Neill, and an 
array of government officials and agencies.  The complaint 
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asserted claims under Section 7002(a)(1)(B) of the RCRA, 42 
U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B), and Section 505 of the CWA, 33 
U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).  Each statute authorizes citizen suits 
except in certain enumerated circumstances, none of which 
applies here.  Among other things, Raritan Baykeeper sought 
injunctive relief requiring the Defendants to remediate 
sediments in the Raritan River.  The Defendants moved to 
dismiss on abstention grounds. The District Court granted the 
motion, concluding that abstention was appropriate under the 
primary jurisdiction doctrine and under Burford v. Sun Oil 
Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).  Raritan Baykeeper now appeals. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under the citizen 
suit provisions of the RCRA and CWA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6972(a)(1)(B) and 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1), respectively.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
review a district court’s decision to abstain on primary 
jurisdiction grounds or under Burford for abuse of discretion.  
See P.R. Maritime Shipping Auth. v. Valley Freight Sys., 856 
F.2d 546, 549 (3d Cir. 1988) (primary jurisdiction); Riley v. 
Simmons, 45 F.3d 764, 770 (3d Cir. 1995) (Burford).  “We 
review the district court’s decision to abstain for abuse of 
discretion, but the district court’s analysis of the law on 
abstention is subject to de novo review.”  Riley, 45 F.3d at 
770. 
A. 
 Before we address the parties’ arguments on appeal, 
we write briefly on the statutory background of this case.  The 
RCRA and the CWA both authorize citizen suits as a way to 
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ensure their rigorous enforcement.  Raritan Baykeeper 
brought this suit under the RCRA provision authorizing suits  
against any person, including the United States 
and any other governmental instrumentality or 
agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh 
amendment to the Constitution, and including 
any past or present generator, past or present 
transporter, or past or present owner or operator 
of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who 
has contributed or who is contributing to the 
past or present handling, storage, treatment, 
transportation, or disposal of any solid or 
hazardous waste which may present an 
imminent and substantial endangerment to 
health or the environment. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).  The RCRA, however, does not 
permit citizen suits under certain circumstances.  For 
example, a citizen suit cannot proceed if the Administrator of 
the EPA or a state is diligently prosecuting an enforcement 
action through formal proceedings.  See id. §§ 6972(b)(2)(B) 
& (C).   
 Similarly, the CWA authorizes citizen suits 
against any person (including (i) the United 
States, and (ii) any other governmental 
instrumentality or agency to the extent 
permitted by the eleventh amendment to the 
Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation 
of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under 
this chapter or (B) an order issued by the 
9 
 
Administrator or a State with respect to such a 
standard or limitation. 
 
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).  And, like the RCRA, the CWA does 
not allow a citizen suit if the EPA Administrator or a state is 
diligently prosecuting an enforcement action.  See id. § 
1365(b)(1)(B).    
 The parties agree that none of the enumerated 
exceptions to the citizen suit provisions in the RCRA or the 
CWA applies here.  It is therefore undisputed that the District 
Court had jurisdiction over this matter.  We must decide 
whether the District Court erred by declining to hear the case 
for reasons other than those enumerated in the RCRA and 
CWA. 
B. 
 We will first address Raritan Baykeeper’s argument 
that the District Court should not have abstained on primary 
jurisdiction grounds.  Federal courts have a “virtually 
unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given 
them.”  Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).  “Abstention, therefore, is 
the exception rather than the rule.”  Riley, 45 F.3d at 771.  
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction  
applies where a claim is originally cognizable in 
the courts, and comes into play whenever 
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution 
of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, 
have been placed within the special competence 
of an administrative body; in such a case the 
judicial process is suspended pending referral of 
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such issues to the administrative body for its 
views. 
 
United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956). 
 While “[n]o fixed formula exists for applying the 
doctrine of primary jurisdiction,” id., the parties and the 
District Court have relied on a four-factor test for determining 
whether a court should abstain on primary jurisdiction 
grounds.  Those factors are: 
(1) Whether the question at issue is within the 
conventional experience of judges or whether it 
involves technical or policy considerations 
within the agency’s particular field of expertise; 
(2) Whether the question at issue is particularly 
within the agency’s discretion; (3) Whether 
there exists a substantial danger of inconsistent 
rulings; and (4) Whether a prior application to 
the agency has been made. 
 
Global Naps, Inc. v. Bell Atl.-N.J., 287 F. Supp. 2d 532, 549 
(D.N.J. 2003).   
 These factors weigh against the application of primary 
jurisdiction.  The first factor focuses on the competence of the 
court and the agency to address the matter.  While NJDEP has 
expertise in environmental matters, federal courts are 
nonetheless competent to decide cases such as the one before 
us.  Congress decided as much when it wrote the RCRA and 
CWA to authorize citizen suits in federal courts.  When “the 
matter is not one peculiarly within the agency’s area of 
expertise, but is one which the courts or jury are equally well-
suited to determine, the court must not abdicate its 
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responsibility.”  MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 
71 F.3d 1086, 1104 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Elkin v. Bell Tel. 
Co. of Pa., 420 A.2d 371, 377 (Pa. 1980)).   
 The second factor, whether the matter is particularly 
within the discretion of the agency, also weighs against 
applying primary jurisdiction.  Although NJDEP generally 
has discretion over environmental matters, neither the RCRA 
nor the CWA charges NJDEP with enforcing those particular 
statutes.  Indeed, each statute authorizes federal courts to 
address environmental issues.  Accordingly, this matter is not 
particularly within the discretion of NJDEP. 
 Third, there is minimal risk of inconsistent rulings.  
NJDEP’s most recent comment concerning the remediation of 
river sediments came in 2004, when the agency notified NL 
that the company need not conduct any further investigation 
or remediation efforts at that time and stated that a “regional 
approach” should govern remediation of the Raritan River.  
(A. 117.)  Since then, NJDEP has not issued any rulings on 
the matter.  In light of agency inaction with respect to the 
river sediments over the last several years, we see little 
danger of a court-ordered remediation conflicting with 
NJDEP directives.  Moreover, in the event the District Court 
orders remediation that imposes an additional burden on NL, 
“a more stringent remediation standard . . . is not a reason to 
invoke the primary jurisdiction doctrine.”  Interfaith Cmty. 
Org. Inc. v. PPG Indus., 702 F. Supp. 2d 295, 312 (D.N.J. 
2010) (“PPG Industries”). 
 The final factor, whether application to the agency has 
already been made, favors NL because NJDEP has previously 
considered contamination of sediments in the Raritan River.  
The agency, however, last spoke on the issue in 2004, and no 
12 
 
action has been taken since.  Accordingly, this single factor 
cannot outweigh the others that disfavor abstention on 
primary jurisdiction grounds.  
 NL relies on two cases where district courts deemed 
primary jurisdiction abstention appropriate.  Both of those 
cases, however, presented distinguishable factual scenarios.  
In Friends of Santa Fe County v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. 
Supp. 1333 (D.N.M 1995) (“Santa Fe”), the state 
environmental agency conducted extensive hearings and 
issued a permit that required the defendants to undertake 
specific investigative and remediation efforts.  Id. at 1347-48.  
The plaintiffs actively participated in the hearings.  Id. at 
1347.  The plaintiffs, not satisfied with the agency’s 
permitting decision, then brought suit in federal court, 
alleging violations of the RCRA and CWA.  The district court 
abstained on both Burford and primary jurisdiction grounds, 
explaining that the plaintiffs’ action was “little more than an 
indirect collateral attack on the [agency’s] . . . adjudication 
and its present regulatory course.”  Id. at 1348.  The court 
also expressed concern that granting the plaintiffs the relief 
they sought would subject the defendants to conflicting sets 
of obligations:  one from the court and the other from the 
state agency.  Id. at 1350.   
 Similarly, in Davies v. National Cooperative Refinery 
Association, 963 F. Supp. 990 (D. Kan. 1997), the plaintiffs 
sought relief that would have directly conflicted with a state 
environmental agency action.  The defendant and the agency 
reached a settlement agreement in which the defendant 
expressly agreed to continue pumping an aquifer as part of its 
remediation efforts.  Id. at 998.  The plaintiffs, however, 
alleged that the pumping contributed to pollution of their 
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property.  Id.  A court order enjoining the pumping would 
have conflicted with the settlement agreement.   
 Here, by contrast, Raritan Baykeeper’s suit does not 
amount to a “collateral attack” on an NJDEP decision, nor 
does it seek a remedy that necessarily conflicts with any 
agency order.  Accordingly, this is not one of those 
exceptional cases that calls for primary jurisdiction 
abstention. 
C. 
 Next, we address Raritan Baykeeper’s contention that 
the District Court abused its discretion by abstaining on 
Burford principles.   “Burford is concerned with protecting 
complex state administrative processes from undue federal 
interference.”  New Orleans Pub. Serv. Inc. v. Council of New 
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 362 (1989) (“NOPSI”).  “The purpose 
of Burford is to avoid federal intrusion into matters of local 
concern and which are within the special competence of local 
courts.”  Hi Tech Trans, LLC v. New Jersey, 382 F.3d 295, 
303-04 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The “Burford doctrine” provides that  
[w]here timely and adequate state-court review 
is available, a federal court sitting in equity 
must decline to interfere with the proceedings 
or orders of state administrative agencies: (1) 
when there are “difficult questions of state law 
bearing on policy problems of substantial public 
import whose importance transcends the result 
in the case then at bar”; or (2) where the 
“exercise of federal review of the question in a 
case and in similar cases would be disruptive of 
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state efforts to establish a coherent policy with 
respect to a matter of substantial public 
concern.” 
 
NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 361 (quoting Colo. River Conservation 
Dist., 424 U.S. at 813). 
 We have explained that a court must engage in a “two-
step analysis” when deciding whether to abstain under 
Burford.  Riley, 45 F.3d at 771.  The first step is to determine 
“whether timely and adequate state-court review is available.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Only if the answer to 
the question is in the affirmative may a court then consider 
whether “the case before it involves difficult questions of 
state law impacting on the state’s public policy or whether the 
district court’s exercise of jurisdiction would have a 
disruptive effect on the state’s efforts to establish a coherent 
public policy on a matter of important state concern.”  Id. 
 We doubt that Raritan Baykeeper could obtain timely 
and adequate state court review.  Raritan Baykeeper argues, 
and the Defendants do not dispute, that this action could not 
have been brought in state court because federal courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction over RCRA and CWA citizen suits.  
This view accords with that of most other courts to have 
considered the question.  See, e.g., Chico Serv. Station, Inc. v. 
Sol P.R. Ltd., 633 F.3d 20, 31 (1st Cir. 2011) (collecting cases 
concluding that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over 
RCRA citizen suits); Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, 542 F.3d 1235, 1242 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over 
citizen suits against the EPA Administrator). 
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 The parties do dispute, however, whether New Jersey 
state law provides adequate and timely review of Raritan 
Baykeeper’s claims.  The District Court agreed with the 
Defendants and concluded that New Jersey’s Environmental 
Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:35A-1 et seq., supplies a functionally 
equivalent cause of action.  If this statute creates a cause of 
action that is “essentially the equivalent” of the RCRA and 
CWA, Raritan Baykeeper could sue under it to obtain timely 
and adequate state court review.  See Riley, 45 F.3d at 773-75 
(concluding that timely and adequate state court review of a 
Securities Exchange Act claim is not available because a 
common law fraud action is not equivalent to a federal 
securities action).  The Environmental Rights Act has a 
citizen suit provision that states: 
a.  Any person may commence a civil action in 
a court of competent jurisdiction against any 
other person alleged to be in violation of any 
statute, regulation or ordinance which is 
designed to prevent or minimize pollution, 
impairment or destruction of the environment. 
The action may be for injunctive or other 
equitable relief to compel compliance with a 
statute, regulation or ordinance, or to assess 
civil penalties for the violation as provided by 
law. The action may be commenced upon an 
allegation that a person is in violation, either 
continuously or intermittently, of a statute, 
regulation or ordinance, and that there is a 
likelihood that the violation will recur in the 
future. 
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b. Except in those instances where the conduct 
complained of constitutes a violation of a 
statute, regulation or ordinance which 
establishes a more specific standard for the 
control of pollution, impairment or destruction 
of the environment, any person may commence 
a civil action in any court of competent 
jurisdiction for declaratory and equitable relief 
against any other person for the protection of 
the environment, or the interest of the public 
therein, from pollution, impairment or 
destruction. 
 
N.J.S.A. 2A:35A-4 (emphasis added).  Here, the RCRA and 
CWA establish the specific standards that Raritan Baykeeper 
alleges the Defendants violated.  Accordingly, the 
Environmental Rights Act does not authorize a state court 
action to enforce rights under the RCRA and CWA.  Raritan 
Baykeeper therefore cannot obtain adequate and timely state 
court review of its claims. 
 Even if we concluded that Raritan Baykeeper could 
obtain adequate and timely state court review, we would not 
find any disruption of New Jersey’s efforts to establish a 
coherent policy on a matter of public concern. The 
Defendants point to New Jersey’s policy on the 
redevelopment of brownfield sites, but it is not apparent, at 
this early stage in the litigation, exactly how the remediation 
of sediments in the Raritan River would necessarily interfere 
with such a policy.1
                                              
1 We are confident that, on remand, the District Court 
can take appropriate action to avoid or minimize any 
  The Defendants also cite the supposed 
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state policy favoring a “regional approach” to remediation, 
but this “policy” derives from a single comment in the 2004 
NJDEP letter to NL regarding remediation of the site.  
Moreover, to date, no such regional approach exists.  “The 
mere fact that a state agency has taken some action on the 
waste at issue here does not make [a court’s] subsequent 
involvement a disruptive intrusion into the state’s capacity to 
create a coherent policy.”  PPG Industries, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 
309.   
D. 
 In sum, we conclude that neither primary jurisdiction 
nor the Burford doctrine calls for abstention in this case.  This 
outcome is consistent with the decisions of our sister circuits.  
The First Circuit explained that federal courts must “exercise 
great caution in considering abstention,” and that “the 
circumstances justifying abstention will be exceedingly rare,” 
because declining to hear a case for a reason not enumerated 
in the RCRA “would substitute our judgment for that of 
Congress about the correct balance between respect for state 
administrative processes and the need for consistent and 
timely enforcement of RCRA.”  Chico Serv. Station, Inc., 633 
F.3d at 31, 32.  Similarly, the Seventh Circuit observed that, 
while “there may be room for applying the doctrines of 
abstention or primary jurisdiction . . . in cases in which a state 
has a formal administrative proceeding in progress that the 
citizens’ suit would disrupt,”  abstention in RCRA ordinarily 
would amount to “an end run around the RCRA.”  PMC, Inc. 
v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 619 (7th Cir. 1998).  
                                                                                                     
interference with any state policy on redevelopment of the NL 
site. 
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The same logic also applies to CWA actions, since that statute 
similarly provides for citizen suits except under specific, 
enumerated circumstances, none of which apply here. 
 Raritan Baykeeper asks us to go a step further and hold 
that primary jurisdiction and Burford abstention never apply 
to RCRA and CWA actions.  Like our sister circuits, we 
decline to impose such a general rule.  As Judge Posner noted 
in PMC, Inc., 151 F.3d at 619, abstention might be 
appropriate in cases with heightened state involvement as 
evidenced by “a formal administrative proceeding in process 
that the citizens’ suit would disrupt.”  But such a case is truly 
the exception, not the rule, and is not present here.  
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment 
of the District Court and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
